CRIMINAL LAW: DEMISE OF "STATUS""ACT" DISTINCTION IN SYMPTOMATIC
CRIMES OF NARCOTIC ADDICTION
In Watson v. UnitedStates, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that Title II of the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act of 19662 was unconstitutional insofar as it
excluded individuals who had two pre-1966 felony convictions from
rehabilitation eligibility. More importantly, the court suggested a
course for subsequent constitutional challenge of statutes punishing
the use or possession of narcotics by non-trafficking addicts. Albert
Watson, a drug addict, was charged with violations of sections
4704(a) of title 263 and 174 of title 21 which make possession of
unstamped narcotics prima facie evidence of unlawful dealing.
Although his defense was based primarily upon traditional insanity
grounds, Watson moved for dismissal after the conclusion of the
evidence on the ground that the eighth amendment prohibited the
punishment of a narcotics addict for possession of narcotics. Watson
was found guilty, and the judge, considering him ineligible for
disposition under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966
because' of his two prior felony convictions, sentenced him to the
mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment. 5 On appeal, a panel
of the court of appeals held that the ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence was in violation of the eighth amendment as cruel and
1. No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (Supp. IV, 1969). The Act is designed to provide medical
rehabilitative treatment for convicted narcotics addicts in lieu of traditional criminal disposition
and sentencing.
3. 1INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 4704(a) provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs
except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the
absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps. . . shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of
this subsection ...
4. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). This section prohibits the
importation of unlawful narcotic drugs into the United States and the receipt, concealment,
purchase, or sale of such drugs. It further provides:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or to have
had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of
thejury.
5. No. 21,186 at 7-8.
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unusual punishment, vacated the sentence, and requested briefs
regarding the final disposition of the case.' An amicus curiae brief
contended that the criminal sanctions of narcotics laws should not
apply to non-trafficking addicts, that the exclusion classification of
the 1966 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act based upon two prior
felony convictions was a denial-of equal protection as applied to
appellant, and that the court should recognize a new and separate
defense of involuntariness for narcotics addicts. 7 The court of appeals,
sitting en banc, found that the Act, as applied to the appellant, was a
violation of equal protection, vacated the sentence, and remanded the
case to the district judge for resentencing and consideration under
Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.
In the past decade courts have frequently considered the
relationship between the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment and the imposition of criminal penalties upon
narcotics addicts for crimes relating to their status as addicts. In 1962
the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California"reversed the conviction
of a narcotics addict under a California statute' which made the
"status" of addiction a crime. The Court, specifically recognizing
narcotics addiction as a disease, 10 reasoned that the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
prevented the incarceration of an addict for his "status" of addiction
as distinguished from punishment for the "acts" of trafficking in or
possessing narcotics." In two 1966 courts of appeals cases 2 applying
Robinson to the closely related issue of public drunkenness, the
criminal convictions of chronic alcoholics for public drunkenness
were reversed; in dicta,. the courts noted the logical inconsistency of
proscribing punishment for a disease, yet allowing punishment for the
symptoms of that disease. 3. Most state and federal courts have,
however, refused to extend Robinson and have maintained the
6. Id. at 10.
7. For a discussion of traditional notions of involuntariness, see Gillars v. United States, 182
F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
8. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
9. CAL. HEALTH &SAFETYCODE § 11721 (West 1964).
10. 370 U.S. at 667 n.8. The Court noted: "thirty-seven years ago this Court recognized that
persons addicted to narcotics are 'diseased and proper subjects for [medical] treatment.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
11. Id. at 664.
12. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d
761 (4th Cir. 1966).
13. 361 F.2d at 54-55; 356 F.2d at 764-65.
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position that, although an addict may not be held criminally liable for
his "status," he may be prosecuted for his "acts" of possession and

use. 4 These decisions were buttressed by the Supreme Court in Powell
v. Texas'5 where a Texas statute"6 punishing public intoxication was
held constitutional as applied to a chronic alcoholic. The Court,

distinguishing Robinson, reasoned that the statute did not punish the
"status" of alcoholism but rather punished the anti-social "act" of

public drunkenness.

7

Courts applying criminal sanctions to

symptomatic crimes of narocitcs addiction since Powell have relied
heavily upon the Court's distinction between "status" and "act" to
support their refusal to extend Robinson.'" Most commentators,
however, have chided the courts for their refusal to expand Robinson

and have criticized a judicial reasoning which forbids the punishment
of a person as an addict while permitting a similar sanction for the
possession and use of narcotics. 9

Claims that the compulsion of narocitcs addiction should provide
exoneration from criminal sanction have also been rejected by the
courts. In Bailey v. United States the court, in rejecting an addict's
argument that his habit compelled him to obtain contraband drugs

and that, therefore, he should not be held criminally responsible,
declared that no court has accepted the narcotics-compulsion theory

alone as grounds for acquittal. 21 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that the present state of medical knowledge does not

allow a judicial conclusion that narcotics addicts should avoid
criminal liability because of their addiction.2 While the compulsion
14. See, c.g., Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); Freeman v. United States,
357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reineke, 344 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1965); People v. King, 29 I11.2d
150, 193 N.E.2d 790 (1963); State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368 (1963);
State v.Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961).
15. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
16. TEXAS PEN. CODE art. 477 (1952).
17. 392 U.S. at 532.
18. See, e.g., Rangel v. State. 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
19. See generallyCuomo, Mens Rea andStatus Criminality,40 S. CAL. L. REv.463 (1967);
McMorris, Can We Punishfor the Acts of Addiction, 54 A.B.A.J. 1081 (1968); Neibel,
Implications of Robinson v. California, I HOUSTON L. Rav. 1 (1963); Survey, Constitutionality
of Conviction Under Narcotics Statute, 41 WASH. L. REv. 533 (1966); Note, Robinson v.
California-LegalImplications of Narcotics Addiction as a DiseaseRather than a Crime, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 618 (1962). But see McKevitt, The "Untouchable" Acts of Addiction, 55
A.B.A.J. 454 (1969).
20. 386 Fid I(5th Cir. 1967).
21. Id. at4.
22. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,625 (2d Cir. 1966).
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of narcotics addiction is not recognized alone as an affirmative
defense, many courts do allow evidence of narcotics addiction to
support a traditional insanity defense. 23 Commentators generally
believe that narcotics addiction should be more than "some" evidence
of criminal incapacity. Citing numerous medical authorities,
Professor Bowman contends that -narcotics addiction is generally an
indication of a mental defect which, while alone not satisfying
traditional insanity criteria, does, when combined with the
pharmacological compulsion of drug addiction, require a modified
test of criminal responsibility for narcotics addicts.24
Faced with the body of precedent refusing to extend Robinson and
the general judicial refusal to treat narcotics addiction as an
affirmative defense, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was confronted by the Watson case. In discussing appellant's
arguments that Congress either did not intend to punish the nontrafficking addict for possession of narcotics for personal
consumption or, if it did, the statute would be unconstitutional under
Robinson, the court explained that the incomplete record, caused by
Watson's failure to raise these issues until after the conclusion of
evidence, precluded adjudication of such an important question of
statutory construction with constitutional overtones. 2 As to
Watson's criminal responsibility contentions, the court found that the
trial judge had properly submitted the conflicting testimony of the
expert witnesses on the issue of insanity to the jury and refused to
formulate a new test of criminal responsibility for narcotics addicts.2 1
However, the court did suggest that a future defendant might
challenge the applicability of those portions of the federal narcotics
laws that impose criminal sanctions for the possession and use of
narcotics to a non-trafficking addict while alternatively asserting a
Robinson defense. The defendant, the court stated, would have the
burden of going forward with evidence that he was a non-trafficking
addict in possession of narcotics solely for his own use; once the
23. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1,4 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903,908, 34 Cal. Rptr. 17 1,
174 (1963), appealdismissed, 377 U.S. 406 (1964).
24. Bowman, NarcoticAddiction and CriminalResponsibility Under Durham, 53 GEo. L.J.
1017, 1043 (1965). See also authorities cited in note 19 supra.
25. No. 21,186 at21.
26. Id. at 15-16.

27. Id. at 21-22. The defendant would raise these issues by a motion to dismiss under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 120.
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defendant had produced such evidence, the prosecution would
have the burden of proving the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt as
in a traditional insanity situation.23 Finally, the court held that the
two-prior felony exclusion provision of Title II of the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act of 1966 as applied to appellant was
unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the fifth
amendment.? The court noted that the second exclusionary provision
of Title II excludes individuals convicted of unlawful dealing in
narcotic drugs from eligibility for disposition under the Act unless the
court determines that the dealing was primarily to enable the
defendant to obtain a narcotic drug that he requires for his own
consumption, while the fourth exclusionary clause excludes an
individual who has been convicted of any felony on two or more prior
occasions. These sections created an unconstitutional distinction
between addicts who did not have two convictions at the time of the
1966 Act and addicts who did have two convictions at that time: the
addict with two or more pre-1966 convictions could have been
convicted upon a mere showing of possession of narcotics absent the
provision for the determination of whether the defendant's possession
was for the primary purpose of personal consumption. Thus, in view
of the avowed purpose of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of
1966 to punish criminal dealing in narcotics and to rehabilitate
addicts, the court concluded that the distinction between the two
classes of addicts was unconstitutionally discriminatory. 3 Chief
Judge Bazelon concurred with the court's decision but urged that
Watson's appeal was an appropriate case for an examination of the
relationship between drug addiction and criminal responsibility.
Alternatively, Bazelon reasoned that the appellant had adequately
challenged the reach and constitutionality of the statutes under which
3
he was convictedY.
Judge Robb, dissenting, felt that the majority had
correctly perceived that the Act benefitted some addicts while denying
treatment to others but did not agree that the distinction violated the
equal protection clause. Arguing that reform may proceed on a stepby-step basis beginning with the phase of the problem that seems most
acute, Judge Robb contended that the legislature's approach to the
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 32.
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problem was reasonable and that therefore the Act did not deny equal
protection to those addicts with two pre-1966 felony convictions. 2
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Watson suggest that
at least one court is prepared to change the judicial treatment of
narcotics addicts.? The decision indicates that successful arguments
for modification of the law as related to narcotics addiction can be
found in an extension of Robinson's interpretation of the eighth
amendment, narrow statutory interpretation, and evolving notions of
criminal responsibility and insanity. While the Supreme Court in
Robinson stated that its decision would not preclude punishment for
possession of or dealing in narcotics, u it will not be an easy task for
the Court to explain why an addict may not be punished for addiction,
yet may be punished for his symptomatic possession of narcotics for
use.? However, the difficulties in delineating the "symptoms" of the
disease of narcotics addiction may lead courts to avoid the
constitutional issue and dispose of challenges to the convictions of
narcotics addicts for personal possession and use on statutory
grounds. Although the statutory argument in Watson was concerned
solely with the federal narcotics statutes, similar state statutes8 may
also be attacked on the theory that the statutes are not applicable to
non-trafficking addicts. The final basis for change suggested by
Watson, a revision of judicial notions of criminal responsibility and
insanity, may be the most desirable innovation since it would support
further consideration of other psycho-pharmacological factors which
compulsively produce criminal behavior but which cannot be
accommodated by traditional doctrines of insanity or
involuntariness. 3 7 Because narcotics addiction in most cases is
symptomatic of an underlying mental illness' 8 and because the
compulsion of narcotics addiction eventually subjugates all aspects of
the addict's life to the goal of obtaining a steady supply of drugs,39 a
32. Id. at 43-44.
33. If Robinson retains validity, "it must also mean in all logic that (1) Congress either did
not intend to expose the non-trafficking addict possessor to criminal punishment, or (2) its effort
to do so is as unavailing constitutionally as that of the California legislature." Id. at 19.
34. 370 U.S. at 664.
35. No.21,186 at23.
36. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:962A (1950); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 161.02(3) (1951).
37. For the prevailing insanity doctrine in the District of Columbia, see McDonald v. United
States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
38. See Bowman, supranote 24, at 1031.
39. Id. at 1038.
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"new" test of criminal responsibility for the drug addict would not
appear to be a radical departure from traditional insanity defenses. If
this new test is combined with hospital commitment powers in the
judge, 40 the resulting treatment of the narcotics addict as a patient
rather than as a criminal may well lead to a decrease in the recidivist
rate of addicts and may finally make twentieth century judicial
notions of involuntariness consistent with twentieth century scientific
and psychological theory.
40. See, e.g., CAL. WEL. & INST'NS CODE § 6357 (1966).

